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Is Closure Still Possible for the 
Marcos Human Rights Victims?
More than twenty-five years after the downfall of the Marcos 
regime, the dark legacies of the martial law era remain 
unresolved. One of these is the plight of thousands of human 
rights victims who suffered illegal detention, torture, and 
even summary executions. Known collectively as the Marcos 
human rights victims, they still await justice and closure from 
the Philippine government. Although they won a landmark 
case against the Marcos Estate in a Hawaii court in 1992 that 
convicted the former dictator for gross human rights violations 
and levied on the heirs almost US$2 billion in damages, its 
enforcement and resolution is far from over. This paper is an 
account of the efforts of the Marcos human rights victims to 
seek justice and reparations, using the concept of modern-day 
reparations as its conceptual framework. It argues that the end 
goal of reparations is to bring about closure, and closure can 
be attained with any, a combination, or all of the following: 
truth, justice, and redress. 
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[We] are unable to forgive those whom we cannot punish!
Hannah Arendt, !e Human Condition
 
INTRODUCTION
More than twenty-!ve years after the downfall of the Marcos 
dictatorship, justice and closure still elude the victims of human rights 
violations from that era. "is is in contrast to other societies that have 
been able to address crimes against civilians committed during the 
deposed regime and hold perpetrators accountable, notably in Latin 
America and Africa. Such decisive measures to amend historical 
injustices have led to a degree of satisfaction for the victims, which 
is essential in attaining closure and healing wounds brought about by 
con#ict, thus moving towards social reconciliation and harmony.  
Known collectively as the Marcos human rights victims, they !led 
a class suit for illegal detention, torture, summary executions, and 
forced disappearances against the former dictator in Hawaii. "e class 
suit would be both a landmark case and a historic one. It was the 
!rst human rights litigation on a mass scale against a former head 
of state. It was the !rst time a dictator was found guilty of human 
rights violations and ordered to pay his victims. "e case also set a 
precedent in that dictators could no longer hide behind the veneer of 
immunity for actions supposedly done on behalf of the state. At the 
same time, crimes or wrongdoing could no longer escape prosecution 
by concealing them inside national borders and using the sovereignty 
of the state as cover. All in all, the victims were awarded almost US$2 
billion in moral and exemplary damages.
But this victory would only be the start of the victims’ travails, 
for the decision would encounter huge challenges and roadblocks. 
Because compensation for the victims would come from laying claim 
to the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth stashed in a number of Swiss banks, 
it collided with the Philippine government’s e$orts to recover the same 
assets through the e$orts of the Presidential Commission on Good 
Government (PCGG). Besides, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform 
Law states that all assets recovered from the Marcos Estate1 shall be 
used solely for agrarian reform purposes. Two months short of the 
twenty-!fth anniversary, after the case was !rst !led, more than seven 
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thousand victims were !nally able to receive compensation amounting 
to only US$1,000 from their lead counsel Atty. Robert Swift. It is a 
small amount compared to the almost US$2 billion in damages granted 
to them by the Hawaii District Court.2 "e money did not come 
from the Swiss assets but from another Marcos dummy corporation, 
Arelma Foundation, stashed in a Keppel Bank account in Singapore. 
"is time, the PCGG did not lay claim to the assets—allegedly upon 
the orders from Malacañang, whose present tenant, after all, is the son 
of the most famous human rights victim during martial law. "ere is 
an adage that spells out the dilemma of the victims: “the longer it takes 
to pursue a crime, the harder it is to get justice.” 
"is paper is a discussion of the class suit !led by the Marcos human 
rights victims against the Marcos Estate in Hawaii. It shall chronicle 
the events leading to the trial, as well as developments in international 
human rights law that allowed the trial of a non-American former head 
of state in US soil. It then examines why the trial failed in e#ecting 
closure, before !nally providing another track to pursue reparations. As 
such, this paper would like to posit that reparations could be achieved 
or attained with truth, justice, and redress, depending on the degree or 
gravity of the human rights violations and on the options available to 
the state that pursues an accounting of past crimes. 
"ere must be truth-telling in order to establish or determine 
what really transpired during the period concerned, to accord the 
victims or their survivors—and, if possible, their tormentors—the 
right to know about their ordeal and to inform the general public 
of what really happened. But more importantly for the victims, 
truth-telling lays the basis for prosecution and compensation. 
No matter how limited the number of perpetrators put to court, 
or even if the punishment for such o#enses may be considered 
light or not proportional to the crime committed, it is important 
to demonstrate to society the importance of accountability, that 
human rights violations cannot go unpunished. Redress, which 
may also be termed as settlement, refers to the measures or 
amendments the state prescribes or o#ers to the victims in order to 
achieve satisfaction. Such measures are manifold and may include 
the following: !nancial compensation, apology, o$cial recognition 
and commemoration, exemption from military service, housing and 
educational bene!ts for the children of human rights victims who 
disappeared or were executed, etc. "e end goal of all reparation 
measures is closure.
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Furthermore, this paper would like to posit that reparation 
measures such as trials and truth telling activities could only be 
e!ective if they are acknowledged and supported by the state. 
Reparation measures may not be e!ective if it is exclusively a civil 
society-led initiative. However, if the state is constrained or unable 
to e!ect o"cial reparation measures, the viable means of closure for 
human rights victims lay in the realm of symbolic or moral reparations, 
i.e. history writing and commemoration. 
REPARATIONS: CONTEMPORARY 
MEANING AND USAGE
#e concept of reparations, in its narrowest de$nition, means nothing 
more than compensation. Previously, reparations were acts of states 
alone—i.e., they were either the provider or the recipient. Reparations 
were imposed by nations as compensation or payment for damages 
from those who lost a war or con%ict. After the Second World War, 
it was seen as a “victor’s justice,” because the crimes of the losing 
countries—such as the Nazi’s atrocities against the Jews and Russians, 
as well as the Japanese massacre of Chinese civilians—were ampli$ed, 
while the atrocities of the winners—like the atomic bombing of Japan 
or the $re-bombing of German cities—were overlooked and not 
examined (Tropey 2003, 63–69). 
#ere are two key components of reparations: (1) it singles out the 
role of states, since states and state agents, as the violators of human 
rights, have the key responsibility for making reparations; and (2) 
restorative justice, which involves returning the victims as much as 
possible to the status quo ante, while acknowledging the impossibility 
of full compensation (Ignatie! 2001, 17).
Reparations have been accentuated on states undergoing 
transitions to democracy as a way to heal social wounds and hasten 
the process of reconciliation. #e changed human rights regime have 
forced states from skirting accountability by hiding behind its veneer 
of immunity or providing unquali$ed protection for its agents. Instead, 
states should assume the following responsibilities to break away from 
the military-like practices of the past and be more accountable to its 
citizenry. Among these new tasks for democratic states are: (1) the 
obligation to do justice, which is to punish the perpetrators if the 
crimes committed were determined to be criminal in nature; (2) the 
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obligation to grant victims the right to know, which is to investigate all 
aspects of a violation that is still shrouded in mystery and to disclose to 
victims, friends, relatives, and society such aspects; (3) the obligation to 
grant reparations, which includes both monetary and non-monetary 
gestures to express recognition of the harm done and an apology in 
the name of society; and (4) the obligation to see to it that those who 
have committed the crimes while serving in any capacity in the armed 
and security forces should not be allowed to continue on the rolls of 
reconstituted democratic law-enforcement or security-related bodies 
(Hayner 2001, 12). 
But modern day reparations also brought about the tension between 
the local and the global. It re!ected the struggle between local and 
global resolutions to con!icts at a time when globalization, especially 
in the "eld of dispensing justice, increased the interconnectedness 
of political-decision making. Reparations raised the question of 
interaction, as well as the dynamics, between the internalization of 
justice and the sovereignty of the state—up to what point or extent 
should the response to harm rightly remain under the control of the 
state where the harm occurred? If conventional norms point to the 
state, experiences with transitioning societies towards democratic rule 
point increasingly toward non-state actors (Boraine 2008, 2). 
#ere are three basic streams or sources of demand for reparations. 
First are those cases arising from acts of injustice perpetrated during 
the Second World War. #ese include claims arising from state-
sponsored mass killings (the Holocaust being the prime example), 
forced labor, and sexual exploitation on the part of the Axis powers. 
In Asia, the most publicized would be the so-called comfort women. 
It also included wartime incarceration of Japanese immigrants in the 
US and Canada. 
#e second set of reparation claims stem from colonialism, both 
in the classical European sense and in internal colonization, such 
as slavery, apartheid, forced assimilation imposed on indigenous 
populations, and occupation or appropriation of ancestral lands. In the 
former case, there are African nations that plan to seek reparations for 
economic devastation brought about by European colonialism in the 
last century. In the latter, reparations are normally undertaken by First 
World countries vis-a-vis their indigenous populations. For example, 
Australia apologized for taking young Aborigines away from their 
parents and forcing them to live in white families to hasten the process 
of assimilation. Canada likewise apologized to Native Americans or 
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First Nations as atonement for taking over their lands for commercial 
purposes. 
!e third set of reparation claims arose from state terrorism 
and other authoritarian practices during the transition process to 
democratic rule by countries in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and 
South Africa. !e victims were generally understood not in racial but 
in political terms and constitute groups with a shared experience of 
political repression. Reparations such as monetary compensation in 
South Africa, Chile, and Argentina came as a result of the "ndings 
of the truth commissions. Reparations for the victims were primarily 
concerned with clarifying the circumstances under which the victims 
of the regime su#ered (Tropey 2001, 335–37). 
!e following are mechanisms or measures most commonly used 
to repair historical wrongs committed in order to obtain justice and 
thereby e#ect closure:
Prosecution or trials. Punishment for perpetrators of human 
rights violations through trials may be the most visible and dramatic 
form of pursuing justice, but they are time-consuming and contentious. 
In some Latin American countries, such as Argentina and Uruguay, 
trials for perpetrators of past human rights abuses were postponed 
because it brought further instability to newly-established democratic 
regimes that teetered on the verge of collapse. Many transitioning 
societies often faced the dilemma of choosing only either justice or 
peace but not both. Of late, trials of former dictators have been raised 
to the international level, and sometimes even under UN supervision. 
!is is to preserve or to minimize threats to internal social cohesion 
in post-con$ict societies to aid countries that have limited judicial 
capabilities, or to come up with tribunals that meet international 
standards (Bassiouni 1996; cf. Reinisch 2005; Mascarenhas 2005). 
Financial compensation. Financial compensation may arise as a 
result from the reports of truth commissions, a decision or order from a 
court undertaking trials or prosecutions of human rights violators, or a 
policy of restitution if the state so decides. In the "rst case, the victims 
of the apartheid regime in South Africa received substantial amounts 
of money at the behest of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
Argentine and Chilean dissidents also received modest "nancial help 
from the government after the "ndings of truth commissions were 
announced to the public. 
Truth commissions. One of the most common demands from 
victims and their kin in many transitional societies is an o%cial truth-
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telling activity. Truth commissions have four important elements: it 
focuses on the past; does not concentrate on a speci!c event but paints 
an overall picture of certain human rights violations over a period of 
time; it exists for a pre-determined period of time; and it is vested with 
a certain authority (Hayner 2001, Annex C). 
"e !rst country that came up with this mechanism was Argentina. 
A truth commission was established immediately after the end of the 
military regime of Gen. Jorge Videla and its “dirty war” on dissidents 
in 1982. "en President Raul Alfonsin established the National 
Commission for Disappeared Persons the following year, which came 
up with a !nal report entitled Nunca Mas (Never Again) four years 
later. "e report was used to prosecute the military, but such attempts 
were met with successive military revolts and eventually succumbed 
to them. In spite of the praises being heaped upon truth commissions, 
they are actually compromises between prosecution and amnesty. 
Political stability or sometimes reconciliation are sought by o#ering 
amnesty to agents or elements of the old regime, but at the same time, 
it seeks to bene!t the victims and society as a whole by letting the 
public know about what happened through a formalized structure of 
truth-telling (Skaar 1999, 1119).
Lustration. Contrary to popular perception, lustration—or the 
systematic vetting of public o$cials for links to the communist-era 
security services—was widely adopted in Eastern Europe in the early 
1990s not because of its etymological association with the Roman 
rites of puri!cation, but because politicians and the public heard it 
being used by bureaucrats during battles for control of Czechoslovak 
!les in preparation for its !rst democratic elections after the downfall 
of the communist regime. "e term “lustration” has long been used 
by Slav and Slavophone archivists to refer to the compilation of an 
inventory or register (Williams et al. 2001, 24–25). “Lustration” and 
“decommunization” were used interchangeably. While the former is 
understood as ascertaining whether an occupant of a particular post 
worked for or collaborated with the communist security services, the 
latter refers to the wider removal and exclusion of people from o$ce 
for having been functionaries of the Communist Party or related 
institutions (Ibid., 35–37). "us, to lustrate someone meant to check 
whether his name appeared in a database and bar him from employment 
in the state bureaucracy, especially in its security apparatuses. 
Amnesty. "e granting of amnesty stems from many concerns: 
political stability, reconciliation, and the need for social cohesion. 
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While new democratic regimes and human rights advocates may 
be predisposed to punish past o!enders, the fear of retribution may 
convince them that amnesties are preferable to coups. "ere are other 
reasons for amnesty. In cases of negotiated transitions, similar to that 
of South Africa, there is a tendency that the prospect of a handover 
in the future would depend considerably on whether members of 
the current regime could face retribution. "ere is also the very real 
danger that prosecutions intended to strengthen the rule of law could 
have the reverse e!ect, making reformers accept amnesty and other 
compromises. Furthermore, prosecuting all those responsible for 
past human rights violations may not be feasible, for there are just 
too many. "is was the dilemma faced by Uruguay and Guatemala 
in their transitions to democratic rule (Sriram 2004, 10–11). As 
some of its adherents cynically pointed out, “But is it not democracy 
or the attainment of democratic rule that is the real reparation? Is it 
not o#cial silence, or the policy of letting bygones be bygones, the 
price to pay for a transition to a democratic government? Is it not that 
non-acknowledgment of past crimes keeps the ‘peace and harmony’ in 
society?” (Mendez 1997, 13–14; Hesse and Post 1999, 3–6) 
Moral reparations. Restitution. In its simplest de$nition, 
restitution means to return something which was forcibly or improperly 
taken. It includes personal property (like pieces of art, real estate, or 
money) or communal property (ancestral domains or “homelands,” 
and cultural or historical artifacts). Restitution aims to reestablish 
to the fullest extent possible the situation that existed before the 
violation took place. Restitution may also mean compensation which 
relates to an economically assessable damage resulting from violations 
committed. But it may also mean rehabilitation which may include, 
but is not limited to, legal, medical, psychological, and other cares 
(Kritz 1996, 35).
Apologies. Coming from the Greek word apologos, which originally 
meant an oral or written defense against accusations by others, it came 
to mean as justi$cation, explanation or excuse, and, later on, an account 
of an o!ense that was unintended. An apology may be o#cial or 
personal; it may also be an individual apologizing to a fellow individual, 
a group to an individual, or a state to an individual or a group. Apology 
represents the institutionalization of symbolic exchange as one means 
of precluding or containing socially disruptive con%icts. Apologetic 
discourse presupposes shared de$nitions between the two parties of 
the violation, its severity and implications (Tavuchis 1991, 22–28). 
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Shortly after assuming o!ce, Prime Minister Rudd apologized to the 
Aborigines for forcibly taking their young and bringing them to white 
homes for rearing, a practice common in Australia from the 1920s to 
the 1970s, to hasten the process of assimilation.
Symbolic or Commemorative. Reparations or redress of past human 
rights violations may not only be physical or limited to "nancial 
compensation, educational or housing bene"ts, and exemption from 
military service. If the intention is to inculcate the collective memory 
of the victims to future generations and remind them of the horrors of 
authoritarian rule, then symbolic remembrances may very well be the 
best form of reparations. Aside from erecting markers and memorials or 
establishing museums, symbolic reparations include commemorations, 
which is the setting aside of a particular day to remember a particular 
event or date, to keep alive the memory of the victims and save it 
from going into oblivion, “forgetting,” or “deremembering” (see Smith 
1996).
HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMANITARIAN LAW, 
AND THE MARCOS TRIAL IN HAWAII
#e idea of prosecuting Marcos for human rights violations occurred 
right after the February 1986 People Power Revolt. But legal remedies 
were not available in the Philippines, and even if there were, the tense 
political situation may not be conducive for such an undertaking. 
Ironically, the US legal system provided the basis for prosecting 
Marcos by resurrecting an obscure eighteenth-century law called the 
Alien Tort Claim Act (ATCA). Also, the case was "led in Hawaii 
because it was Marcos’s residence and that part of the Marcoses’ ill-
gotten wealth was in the US. #ese were con"scated by US Customs 
authorities when the Marcos family landed in Hawaii in February 1986 
(Orendain 1992). #e case would become a watershed in international 
jurisprudence, because it was the "rst lawsuit wherein human rights 
abuses committed by a dictator in another country was tried in the US 
and convicted. 
#e Samahan ng mga Ex-detainees Laban sa Detensyon (SELDA; 
loosely translated, Association of Ex-detainees Against Detention and 
for Amnesty), a group of former political prisoners and eventually 
the proponent of the case, sought to seek justice for the thousands 
of human rights victims and to keep alive their collective memory. 
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Besides, the SELDA noted, human rights violators in the military 
have been promoted by the Aquino administration and even occupied 
key government positions (SELDA 1998, 1).3 SELDA’s Executive 
Board met in March 1986 and appointed Atty. Jose Mari Velez, also 
a political detainee, to explore and come up with an action plan. Atty. 
Velez met Atty. Robert Swift from the Kohn, Savett, Klein & Graf 
Law O!ce in Philadelphia and told the latter that it was possible to 
"le a class suit in a US court by using the ATCA. In fact, Swift was 
handling several class suits at the time, foremost of which was the 
case "led by residents of Bhopal, India, where several hundreds died 
after inhaling toxic gases that leaked from a Union Carbide plant that 
manufactured Eveready batteries. Atty. Velez con"ded to the Board 
that Swift’s law o!ce would shoulder all the litigation expenses until 
the case is over. Attorneys’ fees and reimbursement of fees would only 
be settled upon recovery of the awarded money (ibid., 4). In turn, Atty. 
Swift made Atty. Velez his co-counsel in the Philippines, who in turn 
appointed Atty. Rod Domingo, a junior partner in his law o!ce, to 
assist him in the preparation of the case. 
#e SELDA decided that the members of the class suit would be 
those who su$ered human rights abuses from the Philippine military, 
police, and paramilitary forces from September 1972 to February 
1986. Because there was an urgency in "ling the case, Marie Hilao-
Enriquez, another SELDA member, asked her parents Maximo and 
Celsa Hilao, to "le charges and to be the lead plainti$s on behalf of her 
sister Liliosa Hilao, who died while undergoing tactical interrogation 
inside a detention cell in Camp Crame on April 6, 1973 (ibid., 2).
After the SELDA took the depositions in Manila, Atty. Swift 
"led the case at the Hawaii Federal District Court under Judge 
Fong in April 1986. #e court, however, dismissed the case for lack 
of merit, citing the “acts of state doctrine” which gives immunity to 
an incumbent president or head of state (ibid., 3). Atty. Swift then 
appealed the case to the next higher court, the Ninth Circuit of the 
US Court of Appeals in Southern California. #e case would be in 
hibernation over the next four years, until 1990. Luckily for the victims, 
the trial would proceed and would be in their favor. Subsequently, the 
class suit would be revived due to the following factors: (1) the legal 
jurisprudence in the US has changed because of the passage of the 
Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) which complemented the 
ATCA; (2) a human rights case "led against Imee Marcos-Manotoc 
by Archimedes Trajano that debunked the “acts of state doctrine” and 
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paved the way for the class suit to proceed; and (3) Judge Fong was 
replaced by a more sympathetic adjudicator, Judge Manuel Real.
Enacted in 1789 by the newly created state of America, the ATCA 
provides that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations (customary law) or a treaty entered into by the United States.” 
In reality, the ATCA was originally meant to deter piracy and the 
harming of envoys or ambassadors. !e ATCA empowered federal 
courts with subject matter jurisdiction if three basic requirements are 
met: (1) the plainti" is an alien; (2) the defendant is responsible for a 
tort (violation); and (3) the tort violates the law of nations or a treaty 
to which the US is a party (Ratner and Abrams 1997, 205). 
!e ATCA remained an obscure basis for US federal court 
jurisdiction until the 1980 landmark case Filártiga vs. Peña-Irala (or 
the Filártiga case). !e case stemmed from a civil action suit #led by the 
family of Paraguayan activist Joelito Filártiga, then only 17 years old, 
who was tortured and later died while in captivity. !e accused, Gen. 
Americo Peña-Irala, then the chief of police of Asuncion, Paraguay, 
was in the US and was caught for overstaying his visitor’s visa in early 
1979. !e Center for Constitutional Rights, an advocacy or public 
interest law group which helped the PCGG in its early years to recover 
the Marcoses’ assets in the US, and Amnesty International informed 
Joelito’s sister Dolly, who was also living in the US at the time, about 
Peña-Irala. She called the Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
which apprehended Peña-Irala for the violation. He was later charged 
for the death of Joelito in a Brooklyn courthouse. !e defense argued 
that the ATCA could not be used because “the law of nations,” as it 
was conceived in the 1780s, was far di"erent than it was in the 1980s. 
However, Judge Eugene Nickerson dismissed the case, saying that 
wrongdoing committed by a government against its own people could 
not count or constitute as violation of the law of nations. When the 
case was appealed, the Second Circuit invited the State Department 
to submit an amicus brief. Under the Carter administration’s guiding 
principle of using human rights as a foreign policy objective, both 
the State and Justice departments jointly submitted a brief urging a 
reversal and to permit the suit to proceed (Saguisag 1992). 
As a result, Chief Judge Irving Kaufman ruled that the law of 
nations being referred to was not as it was in 1789, but, rather, as to 
how it had evolved and existed among the nations of the world today. 
!e court further ruled that acts falling under the edict should be 
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“universal, de!nable, and obligatory international norms.” And that 
torture, by virtue of its universal condemnation both in the domestic 
laws of all nations and in numerous international declarations and 
treaties, did violate the law of nations, especially if it was committed 
against its own people. "e decision also brought to the fore the 
“transitory” nature of torts—i.e., the right to sue follows a wrongdoer 
across national boundaries. Peña-Irala was eventually deported but 
the case proceeded without him. In 1994, the Brooklyn court issued 
a US$10.4 million default judgment in favor of the Filártiga family, 
but nothing was collected. "ey, however, received satisfaction from 
having established a precedent case for other torture victims (Ratner 
and Abrams 1997, 205–6). By the late 1980s, the ATCA was used 
in several Filártiga-style cases against dictators and senior security 
o#cers.  
"e other human rights instrument that bolstered the prosecution 
against Marcos in the US was the passage of the TVPA in 1992. "e 
law authorized civil suits against individuals of any nationality who used 
torture or summary executions on another person. "e law required four 
basic elements to take e$ect: (1) the defendant must have committed 
torture or an extrajudicial killing; (2) the defendant must have acted 
under actual or apparent authority, or authorized by any law, of a foreign 
nation; (3) the plainti$ must be a victim, their legal representative, or 
a person who may be a claimant in a wrongful death action; and (4) 
the plainti$ must have exhausted remedies in the country where the 
conduct giving rise to the claim occurred. "e TVPA bolstered the 
ATCA by extending the right to sue US citizens but, unlike the ATCA, 
the TVPA covers claims against torture and summary executions only. 
"us, while the ATCA provided the Hawaii court the jurisdiction for 
prosecuting Marcos, the TVPA provided the basis for compensating 
the victims. "e TVPA also became the basis for dividing the victims 
into three categories: those tortured, tho summarily executed, and 
those who disappeared (presumably summarily executed). However, 
one limitation of both ATCA and TVPA cases is that they authorize 
claims against individuals only and not states. Moreover, the TVPA 
limits prosecution to those crimes committed ten years prescription 
period—i.e., a case must be !led within ten years after the crime has 
been committed. Although civil suits do not lead to the same degree 
of accountability as a criminal process, they do, however, o$er a way of 
seeking justice and represent one form of authoritative arbitration of 
legal issues relating to human rights violations (ibid., 207–8). 
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One month after !eeing the Philippines, there were at least three 
lawsuits that were "led against Ferdinand Marcos, his daughter Imee 
and General Fabian Ver in three judicial districts in the US for human 
rights abuses committed between 1972 and 1986. #ese were the 
following: 
!e “Group of 21” case. #ey were student activists who were 
detained and tortured by the military during the early part of the 
martial law period, but who left for the US for further studies or to 
migrate.4 #ey were represented in the Marcos trial in Hawaii by 
Atty. Melvin Belli from San Francisco. #is case was originally "led 
in Hawaii, but was later incorporated in the Maximo Hilao et.al. class 
suit.
!e “Group of !ree” or the Piopongco case.5 #is case involves 
Jaime Piopongco, Francisco Sison, and Jose Maria Sison. Francisco Sison, 
however, died during the martial law years and his father represented 
him during the trial. Jaime Piopongco was an activist and radio station 
owner. His radio station was closed and his house searched by security 
agents immediately after the declaration of martial law. When he was 
arrested, he was brought to Malacañang palace, interrogated, subjected 
to mock executions, and held incommunicado. When released, he made 
his way to the America and became a US citizen. Included in this case 
was the former Chair of the Communist Party of the Philippines, Jose 
Ma. Sison, who was personally interrogated by Marcos and then spent 
"ve years in solitary con"nement and another three years in near-
solitary con"nement. Both Sison and Piopongco "led cases against 
Marcos in 1986, but these were dismissed. When the dismissals were 
reversed due to the Trajano case, the two pursued their cases separately. 
Sison’s case was included in the class suit, while Piopongco sued the 
Marcoses alone and was awarded damages worth US$75,000.
!e Maximo Hilao et al. case.6 #e case was "led by Maximo 
Hilao on behalf of her daughter Liliosa in 1986.7 By having the biggest 
number of plainti$s—9,539—it became the !agship case in which 
the other cases were incorporated. Spearheaded by the SELDA and 
supported by human rights groups in the Philippines, such as the Task 
Force Detainees of the Philippines, Atty. Jose Mari Velez was its counsel 
until his death in 1991 and was replaced by Atty. Romeo Capulong.
When the cases were "led, the American judges were caught in 
a bind as these acts were committed outside of the sovereignty of the 
US and therefore deemed non-justiciable. Eventually, all the lawsuits 
were dismissed on the grounds that the violations were done in the 
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pursuit of o!cial duties or what may be called “acts of state.” "e 
Philippine government, courtesy of o!cials sympathetic to the plight 
of the human rights victims, #led an amicus curiae brief urging the 
US courts to exercise jurisdiction over the said cases. "e Philippine 
government disputed the arguments made by the defendants that they 
knew nothing or were not aware of the human rights abuses, even 
providing documents to show that Marcos was given a regular update 
of the torture sessions and executions of political detainees.8 But the 
clincher would be the Archimedes Trajano case.9
Archimedes Trajano was a Manila-based student who attended 
a forum where Imee Marcos-Manotoc spoke. Trajano had the 
audacity to question the appointment of Marcos-Manotoc as head 
of the Kabataang Barangay. After the forum he was kidnapped, 
interrogated, and tortured to death. His mother Agapita sued Imee 
Marcos-Manotoc for false imprisonment, kidnapping, wrongful 
death, and deprivation of rights. Marcos-Manotoc’s defense was that 
she could not be sued because she was acting in an o!cial capacity as 
a government agent and had control over security personnel. In short, 
she claimed immunity under the Foreign Service Immunities Act 
that exempted foreign states and their agents from prosecution. "e 
court struck down her argument for two reasons. One, the crime was 
committed outside of the scope of her o!cial duties and beyond her 
authority. And two, she acted on her own authority and not upon the 
authority of the Philippine government.  
When the case was appealed, the judge ruled that Article III of the 
US Constitution granted federal courts jurisdiction over civil actions 
brought by foreign plainti$s against foreign nationals or sovereigns. It 
further pointed out that actions against foreign nationals in US courts 
raised sensitive issues over US foreign relations, thereby making it a 
federal concern falling with the purview of federal courts.10
With this ruling, the human rights victims #led for the reopening 
of the original case by way of a motion for reconsideration at the 
US Court of Appeals’ Ninth Circuit in San Francisco, California. 
"e Estate11 quickly #led a manifestation against the appeal by the 
human rights victims, attacking the claims as being barred by the 
statute on limitations, or the prescribed period in #ling a case—a mere 
technicality. But the court deemed the appeal as meritorious. "e court 
had a choice of applying Hawaii’s two-year statute of limitations on 
tort claims, or the Philippines’ one-year period for bringing actions 
for personal injury caused by a public o!cer arising from martial law, 
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or the TVPA, which allowed for an equitable tolling of the statute 
on limitations, which means the case being !led should have been 
committed within the last 10 years. "e court opted for the third and 
deemed the appeal timely !led, paving the way for the legal action to 
be !led in March 1986. 
Finally, on the merits of the case, the Estate was found liable. 
"ough Marcos did not directly order, conspire, or aid the military 
in the torture, he knew of such conduct and failed to use his power 
to prevent such abuses. "e court upheld the concept of command 
responsibility in international law. As a result, the Ninth Circuit Court 
reversed the earlier decisions dismissing the cases against the Marcos 
Estate and remanded the cases for trial to the District of Hawaii under 
Judge Manuel Real. "e Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation 
consolidated all the cases and certi!ed it as a class action suit on 8 
April 1991 (Ramirez 2001, 115–16). "e US District Judge Manuel 
Real from Los Angeles was appointed to the Hawaii District Court in 
1988, and replaced the former judge Harry Fong. Judge Manuel Real, 
in his concern and kind consideration for the human rights victims, 
proved to be the opposite of the previous judge.  
"e class suit, now docketed as Multi-District Litigation 840, was 
bifurcated. "e !rst phase was divided into two stages: the “liability 
stage” where the court, through the jury, determined whether the 
Marcos Estate was liable for violations of international law; and if 
the Marcos Estate was guilty of the crimes committed. After which 
the case proceeded to the “damage stage” in order to determine the 
amount of compensation due to the class or the whole set of victims. 
"e second phase was intended for the court to determine the amount 
of compensation due to each of the category of victims. A Special 
Master, usually a retired US appellate judge appointed by the Hawaii 
District Court, would hear and receive evidence or individual claims 
to determine the speci!c damages sustained by each member of the 
class suit. 
Atty. Swift had thirty-!ve witnesses to testify in court. Because 
only half could travel to Hawaii the rest used videotape presentations. 
Judge Manuel Real then classi!ed and clustered the following as 
subclasses: (1) arrested and tortured by military and paramilitary 
groups while in their custody; (2) summarily executed by military and 
paramilitary groups; and (3) seized and caused to disappear by military 
and paramilitary groups, and presumed dead. "e main trial by jury in 
Hawaii started at exactly nine o’clock in the morning of 9 September 
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1992, at Court Room 5 on the second !oor of the federal courthouse. 
It was estimated to last for about a month, but the clarity and impact of 
the testimonies needed only ten working days to determine Marcos’s 
culpability. "e defense presented no witnesses. "e #rst part of the 
trial ended on 22 September 1992.
It was not only Filipinos who took the witness stand. Two former 
US ambassadors, William Sullivan and Stephen Bosworth, also 
testi#ed in court in favor of the human rights victims. Mr. Bosworth, 
ambassador from 1984 to 1987 and the last witness to be presented by 
the plainti$s, told the court that although Marcos repeatedly promised 
to do something about human rights abuses on several occasions, he 
did nothing. Said Ambassador Bosworth, “He would always tell me 
‘I’ll #x this and that’ but all he did was wrist slapping, never any serious 
prosecution.” Bosworth also said that from 1972 to 1986, Marcos’s 
control over the military was absolute. Marcos, he observed, was in 
charge on a very “micro” level and that he ran everything. Asked why 
the US government did not act more incisively and forcefully, as it 
did against Manuel Noriega of Panama, Bosworth replied, “We could 
have just cut o$ our aid to the Philippines but that might have resulted 
in our being thrown out of our bases by Marcos. It was very di%cult 
to do anything incisive” (Kaser 1992b). In hindsight, the testimonies 
of the two former envoys, though helpful for the victims, unwittingly 
con#rmed what everyone suspected all along: that human rights were 
subsumed under security considerations. Indeed, Marcos knew how to 
play the American card and exploited it to the hilt.  
"e jury found the Marcos Estate guilty for the acts of torture, 
summary executions, and disappearances when it handed its verdict 
on 22 September 1992. On 23 February 1994, the court awarded the 
victims US$1.2 billion as compensatory damages for all the plainti$s. 
"en on 20 January 1995, the court again awarded the victims US$776 
million for exemplary damages for the class suit members. "e Hawaii 
District Court was also able to determine that the individual plainti$s 
be awarded money ranging from US$150,000 to US$700,000.
"e three-phased trial o%cially culminated on 27 January 1995, 
when the Hawaii District Court released its Final Order. First, it 
found the investigation report of the Special Masters it sent to the 
Philippines to validate the 135 randomly selected the previous year to 
be authentic, and individually awarded them #nancial remuneration 
ranging from US$20,000 to US$185,000, depending on their personal 
ordeal or circumstances. "e court also rewarded the remaining subclass 
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that su!ered torture the aggregate amount of US$251,819,811.00 to 
be divided pro rata; the remaining subclass that su!ered summary 
executions US$409,191,760.00 to be divided pro rata; and the 
remaining subclass that su!ered involuntary disappearance (and are 
presumed dead) the aggregate amount of US$94,910,640.00 to be 
divided pro rata.12
In addition to awarding US$776 million in compensatory damages, 
the court also awarded the human rights victims US$1,197,227,417.90 
in exemplary damages to be divided pro rata, to make an example for 
the common good. Furthermore, the court added prejudgment interest 
of ten per cent per annum from 7 April 1986, when the case was "rst 
"led, to January 1995, when the case or class suit "nally ended. Judge 
Real reasoned out that this award was due to the diminution of the 
victims’ awards for the long time it took from the time when the 
injuries were committed up until an entry of judgment was made. #e 
award also took into consideration the value of the money that were 
compounded by in$ation and the depreciation of the Philippine peso 
to the US dollar which is in accord with laws of the state of Hawaii. 
#e judge, now imbued with the language of the new international 
human rights regime, noted that this was done in “manifestation of the 
objectives of international law which is to make human rights victims 
whole for their injuries.”13
In spite of the many obstacles and challenges, the class suit was 
able to achieve many objectives based on what the victims had set out 
to do when it was "rst "led in 1986. First, the case was able to give the 
victims a sense of justice even if the case was tried abroad. In fact, there 
was a lot of sympathy and goodwill towards the human rights victims 
and the case in general, even from ranking government positions who 
were themselves victims of imprisonment or torture.
Second, the class suit was able to expose the violations of the Marcos 
Estate. It provided the Filipinos and the international community a 
glimpse of the heinous crimes the Marcos family committed. #ird, 
the class suit proved that Marcos, and dictators in general, were not 
beyond the reach of the law. #e suit was able to deny them safe haven 
in the US. Fourth, the landmark case was a contribution to international 
jurisprudence on human rights and henceforth to the strengthening of 
a human rights regime in the world. It was the "rst class action human 
rights suit in history using the ATCA. It was also the "rst time that 
plainti!s were awarded compensation from the person authorizing the 
crime. Until this class suit, never before has a former head of state 
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been found guilty of human rights abuses in a regular court. Finally, 
the award given by the Hawaii District Court for exemplary damages 
represents the largest personal injury award in history.
Yet the class suit had many limitations. First, if the trial would be 
the equivalent of a truth-telling activity, it was a failure. !e trial did 
not produce the catharsis necessary for victims to tell their ordeal and 
confront their tormentors. Of the more than nine thousand victims 
listed in the complaint, only 137 individual cases were selected at 
random by a computer to represent the whole class. Fewer still were 
able to testify in court during the trial period. !ere was no way of 
somehow comprehending the scale and magnitude of human rights 
violations during martial law. !e US court’s jurisdiction did not 
extend to the military who were directly involved. More importantly, 
the testimonies at the trial were not disseminated to the Filipino public 
in order to come up with a better understanding of the Marcos regime. 
Second, if the class suit would be the equivalent of a prosecution trial 
for Marcos and his Estate, it was grossly insu"cient as the case was 
civil and not criminal. !ough Marcos was told to pay for his crimes, 
he escaped going to prison for it.
!e government could have done more to satisfy the victims’ 
longing for justice. First, whoever sits as president has the duty or 
responsibility to at least o#er regrets, if not apologies, to the victims, 
mainly because it is from their su#erings that the present democratic 
dispensation rests. As commander-in-chief and head of the security 
apparatus, a new president assumes or takes into his or her fold the 
security apparatus that was once responsible for such acts. Second, the 
government’s claim to the Marcoses’ assets need not be diametrically 
opposed to the claims of the human rights victims. !ere was much 
sympathy for the human rights victims, yet this did not translate to 
concrete gains, such as crafting new laws on human rights or modifying 
the limitations set by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law to 
include other social justice programs.  
!ird, the $nancial award granted by the Hawaii District Court 
was truly phenomenal. As a consequence, it became the benchmark 
by which to measure proposed compromise agreements. Up to a 
considerable degree, the proposed settlements with the Marcos Estate 
were deemed too small when compared to the total amount awarded by 
the court. In the end, the astronomical amount became an illusion. !e 
landmark decision became impossible to enforce due to the objections 
of the Philippine government. And while the Swiss government 
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recognized the need to include compensation for the human rights 
victims from stashed Marcos assets in Switzerland, these assets should 
be recovered !rst by the Philippine government who after all !rst laid 
claim to these ill-gotten wealth in 1986. 
AGAINST RESTITUTION AND FAILED LEGISLATION
"e overwhelming victory obtained in Hawaii however would not lead 
to the enforcement of the decision of and would not provide satisfaction 
for the victims. To the contrary, it would be the start of victims’ travails. 
Because the money to be used in compensating the victims would come 
from the Marcoses themselves, the Hawaii District Court set its sight 
on the fabled assets stashed in Switzerland. By doing so, it went on a 
head-on collision with the Philippine government, whose policy was to 
recover the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth and bring it back to the national 
treasury. In fact, Executive Order No. 1, Cory Aquino’s !rst directive 
upon assuming power, was to create the PCGG, whose sole task was 
to run after the Marcos wealth abroad. As early as April 1986, the 
PCGG was in contact with Swiss authorities on how to recover these 
assets. In short, the e#orts of the Hawaii District Court at reparations 
collided with the restitution policy of the Aquino administration. And 
in a landmark ruling in 1995, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court ruled 
that the Marcoses’ Swiss assets belonged to the Philippine government 
and placed them in an escrow account until after a favorable ruling 
from a local court is obtained. "is is recognition by the Swiss courts 
that the Philippine government’s claim over the Marcos assets was 
superior to that of the human rights victims. 
To satisfy the victims’ legitimate quest for !nancial 
compensation, both the Ramos and Estrada administrations came 
up with proposed negotiated settlements. It was a compromise 
between insisting on the full recovery of the amount, which was 
unrealistic, and receiving a minute portion of the Marcos wealth. 
But it contained many preconditions, among them absolving the 
dictator and his family of wrongdoing. Unfortunately, this option, 
plus ideological factors, led the permanent divide between two 
victims’ groups and their supporters. In the end, whatever settlement 
the executive branch was devising was struck down by the judiciary, 
both by the Sandiganbayan, the Philippines’ anti-graft court, and 
the Supreme Court. 
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In hindsight, the Philippine experience at reparations and closure 
was greatly di!erent from those of other countries. Some of the other 
countries did not su!er from “kleptocracy” and could thus focus their 
e!orts on addressing past human rights violations. In the Philippines, 
the human rights issue was muddled by e!orts at reclaiming the 
Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth to the point where the claimants and the 
Philippine government collided despite the shared objective of closure 
of the martial law era. 
"e proposed compromise agreement was caught in the middle of 
the struggle for control of the contested assets between the Philippine 
government and the Marcos Estate. As the extent and value of these 
assets were undetermined, they became something of an imaginary 
treasure chest that the Ramos and Estrada administrations salivated 
over. "us, the claim of the human rights victims for compensation ran 
smack against the e!orts of both presidents to rehabilitate the Marcos 
family. In a way, the victims’ claims were, so to speak, a pestering #y in 
the Marcos pie.
Cognizant of the limitations of the law with regard to reparations 
and of the failed quest for a compromise agreement, the human rights 
victims opened another track: to lobby for the passage of a new law 
that obliges the state to recognize their su!erings and compel it to 
provide them compensation. "is avenue became feasible as more and 
more progressives were elected in congress and the senate beginning 
in 1998. In the senate, human rights victims and those sympathetic 
to the issue were elected, among them Aquilino Pimentel, Joker 
Arroyo, John Osmena, Sergio Osmena III, and the late Raul Roco. 
Perhaps feeling guilty about the matter or maybe fearing public 
ridicule, senators on the opposite side of the fence, like Juan Ponce 
Enrile and Gregorio Honasan, did not raise any form of opposition to 
the bill at all. Likewise, in the House of Representatives, a number of 
congress persons sympathetic to the case were elected, such as Edcel 
Lagman, whose brother Hermon was a victim of forced disappearance, 
Wigberto Tanada, Lorenzo Tanada III, Mujiv Hataman, and many 
others. More importantly, human rights victims themselves were 
elected to o$ce by way of the party-list system. Etta Rosales was 
elected as representative of the Akbayan party, while Satur Ocampo 
represented Bayan Muna. "e bill was almost signed into law towards 
the end of the "irteenth Congress, were it not for pressing concerns 
in the House of Representatives, chief among them the initiative to 
impeach then-president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. At the moment, 
135Is Closure Still Possible for the Marcos Human Rights Victims?
the passage of this law is being stalled by e!orts to make the former 
president and her allies accountable. 
CONCLUSION
While it is extremely necessary to make the Philippine government 
recognize the victims and provide a modicum of compensation, there 
are other ways to compensate the human rights victims. In fact, it need 
not necessarily be "nancial alone. While waiting for the passage of a 
law that would "nally prompt the state to recognize the plight of the 
human rights victims and its obligation to provide reparation, moral 
reparations that address the su!ering of the victims remain an option, 
such as proper memorialization of courageous victims and, better still, 
a rewriting of contemporary Philippine history. Keeping alive the 
memory of martial law need not be demonizing Marcos, but more so in 
stigmatizing this dark past and its legacies. Going back to the original 
purpose of the case, many of those who pushed for the class suit had 
never intended to collect money from the Marcoses. Rather, their goal 
was to bring to trial the Marcos family for their misdeeds and to teach 
future generations about the horrors of this period. In a sense, the 
focus on recovering the Marcoses’ assets veered away from the moral 
imperative of educating the public about the martial law period. In 
the "nal analysis, this could have brought about a substantive degree 
of closure not just for the victims but the nation as a whole, including 
future generations of Filipinos.
NOTES
1 Ferdinand Marcos died on 28 September 1989, and all the cases filed against him 
and the Marcos family were collated and unified under the heading “Marcos Estate,” 
and thereafter represented by Imelda Marcos and her son Ferdinand (Bongbong) 
Marcos, Jr.
2 The Hawaii District Court set the amount of compensation depending on the gravity 
of the crimes committed on the victims. For example, a victim of illegal detention 
could be granted as much as US$45,000, while those who suffered wrongful deaths 
could amount to more than a hundred thousand dollars. 
3 The following documents related to the class suit, otherwise known as the MDL 
840, are contained in the SELDA papers located at the Special Collection of the 
University of the Philippines Main Library. 
4 For the record, the plaintiffs in this case are Gerry Soco, Fluellen Ortigas, Vicente 
Clemente, Jerrold Garcia, Ester Albano Garcia, Ramon Veluz, Jose Asuncion, Rex 
Brown, Alfonso King, Cris Aranda, Ramon Castaneda, Emmanuel Umali, Ramon 
Mappala, Renato Torres, George Gaddi, Susan Araneta, Manuel Buncio, Marcelino de 
Leon, Don Fabi, Ramon Jalipa, and Apolinario Madayag. 
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5 This case is officially docketed as US Court of Appeals, Maximo Hilao, plaintiffs-
appellee, vs. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, defendant-appellant, 987 F2.d 493 and 25 
F3.d 1467 (9th Circuit, 1986 and 1993) as is the main class suit against the Marcos 
Estate. However there are two other cases filed against Marcos, namely: Jose Ma. 
Sison and Jaime Piopongco, plaintiffs-appellees v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 
defendant-appellant, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Circuit, 1992) or otherwise known as the 
Group of Three, and the Group of 21 wherein twenty one students and Fil-Ams filed 
a case in the US against Marcos for human rights violations. While Sison’s case was 
tried separately, the Group of 21 case was incorporated into the Maximo Hilao case. 
6 Maximo Hilao, plaintiff-appellee, v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, defendant-appellant, 
987 F2.d 493 and 25 F3.d 1467 (9th Circuit, 1986 and 1993).
7 The original plaintiffs in the class suit were Maximo Hilao (on behalf of her daughter 
Liliosa Hilao), Danilo Mallari de la Fuente, Gerry P. de Guzman, Renato Manguera 
Pineda, Trinidad Herrera-Repuno, Adora Faye Rivera, Hilda Narciso, Danilo Vizmanos, 
Guillermo Ponce de Leon, Jose Duran, Josefina Hilao Forcadilla, Domiciano Amparo, 
Rodolfo Banosa, Arturo Revilla, Agapita Trajano, and Paula Romero.                                           
8 It was Executive Secretary Joker Arroyo and Senior Adviser Rene Saguisag who 
provided documents left behind by the Marcoses in Malacañang to the prosecution 
lawyers. (See Hawaii Star Bulletin 1992 and Kaser 1992a.)
9 Re: Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation: Agapita Trajano and 
Archimedes Trajano, plaintiffs-appellees, v. Ferdinand E. Marcos, defendant, and 
Imee Marcos-Manotoc, defendant-appellant, 978 F.2d. 493 (9th Circuit, 1992).
10 Ibid. p.3 
11 Ferdinand E. Marcos died on September 1989 and thereafter all cases filed against 
him was renamed The Marcos Estate. Imelda Marcos and their son Ferdinand Jr. 
stood as defendants in lieu of the former dictator.   
12 US District Court, District of Hawaii, “Final Judgment,” MDL 840 and C.A. No. 86–
390 (Celsa Hilao et.al., plaintiffs, v. Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, defendants), 27 
January 1995, par.3.
13 Ibid., par.5.
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